












































Citation for published version:
Broer, T & Chandler, A 2019, 'Engaging experience: Mobilising personal encounters with mental ill-health in
social science', Social Theory & Health, pp. 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41285-019-00094-0
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1057/s41285-019-00094-0
Link:




Social Theory & Health
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Social Theory & Health. The definitive
publisher-authenticated version Broer, T. & Chandler, A. Soc Theory Health (2019).
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41285-019-00094-0 is available online at:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41285-019-00094-0#citeas
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 23. Jul. 2021
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Engaging experience: mobilising personal encounters with mental ill-health in social 
science 
 
Editors: Dr Tineke Broer and Dr Amy Chandler 
 
In ‘Bipolar Expeditions’, anthropologist Emily Martin (2009) writes about her experiences of 
living under the description of manic depression (or bipolar disorder), in the context of a 
broader ethnography of bipolar disorder. Interspersing her observations of support groups and 
other places where such people come together with her own accounts, Martin’s aim is “to 
explore the daily experiences of those who, for better or worse, are participating in the world 
that psychopharmacology has opened up”. Pragmatically, her own diagnosis and use of 
psychotropic drugs gave her access to support groups that she could participate in and observe. 
Martin reflects briefly on the (methodological) challenges of using her own experiences: “My 
own condition might provide a route for me to study aspects of mental illness that could not be 
witnessed in any other way. But fears around the stigma of mental illness would prevent me 
from using key tools in the craft of ethnography” (p. xii). However, this tantalising glimpse 
opens up further queries as to the processes and effects entailed of living such a topic of study, 
where this topic is itself stigmatised, and has historically prompted questions about the 
reliability of those with such experiences.   
Moves such as Martin’s, which incorporate personal experience into accounts of research may 
be paralleled with autoethnography, an increasingly established methodological approach 
where authors draw directly on their own experiences to analyse or reflect upon broader issues 
of concern, including topics relating to mental illness. Authors in this tradition have accounted 
for their drawing on personal experiences in various ways. For instance, Brooks (2010) wrote 
about “an urgent personal and intellectual need to analyze and share my experience with OCD 
[Obsessive Compulsive Disorder]” (Brooks, 2010, p. 250).  Jago (2002) wrote of a similar type 
of urgency in seeking to tell “a story of the ways in which the realities of academia and 
depression are inextricably bound together in my lived experience.” (Jago, 2002, p. 733). Thus, 
these authors – and others – express an (intellectual) desire to ‘do’ something politically with 
their own experiences. Both Jago and Brooks write about the consequences of ‘coming out’, 
as Brooks calls it, including the potential ramifications for their careers; they also both discuss 
the consequences for others implicated in their story. Moreover, Brooks discusses how 
autoethnographic writing, and the vulnerability required, does not automatically serve a 
purpose; rather, it needs to be useful for the particular text, and, arguing with Behar (1996), 
“has to take us somewhere we couldn’t otherwise get to”. However, neither Jago nor Brooks 
addresses the potential epistemological disadvantages of such an autoethnographic project, or 
the wider (political, academic) consequences – except for arguing that coming out may help 
challenge the stigma around mental illness. 
The practice of academics drawing on their own experiences in scholarly texts, however, is far 
from uncontested. Indeed, one of the more well-rehearsed objections to auto-ethnography is 
that it constitutes a form of ‘navelgazing’ (Drechsler Sharp, Riera, & Jones, 2012; Humphreys, 
2005). Moreover, referring to authors such as Martin (and thus not concerned with auto-
ethnography as such), French sociologist Alain Ehrenberg (2009) argues that ‘admitting’ one’s 
mental ill-health in a public place relies on and constructs a particular notion of the self: one 
that confesses its disturbances in order to promote a social cause. He furthermore connects this 
to a particularly American way of viewing the self, and argues this (‘coming out’) is something 
which French scholars would be far less likely to do, relating this to political and organisational 
differences between American and French societies. His arguments, though, prompt further 
reflection on the kinds of subjects we become, enable, or propose, through our knowledge 
practices, the choices we may make regarding the enrolment of personal experience, and how 
each of these is shaped by the cultural contexts we inhabit. As such, Ehrenberg’s writing leads 
us to reflect critically on how - and whether we must – take on certain subject positions (e.g. 
as ‘having depression’, ‘coming out’, being a ‘service-user’), and what effects each of these 
positions may have on our writing and research. 
Our aim, as editors of this special issue, is not to take a predefined position for or against the 
use of personal experiences. Instead, we want to move the debate beyond a for-and-against 
using personal experiences, towards a consideration of what kind of personhood is implied in 
the use of personal experiences of ill-health in social research. Indeed, drawing on scholars 
such as Nikolas Rose (1998) and Alain Ehrenberg (2009), we investigate the ways in which 
personal experiences of mental ill-health – in particular - might prompt new ways of thinking 
about, judging and acting upon the self – with the self being decidedly political. Further, we 
suggest there is a need for much closer consideration of the philosophical and methodological 
implications of (not) drawing on such experiences in our research as social scientists, beyond 
the issue of stigma around mental illness. Resulting from a symposium on the role of personal 
experiences in social scientific research on mental ill-health that we organised in June 2016i, 
in this special issue we raise questions such as: what kind of self is constructed in choosing 
(not) to use personal experience in a particular way? What consequences might these choices 
have? What are the implications for knowledge production? What, if anything, is special about 
(non)disclosure of experiences of mental ill-health, compared to other aspects of biography and 
selfhood? How, if at all, do personal experiences of mental ill-health or distress enable critical 
reflection on the conceptualisation of mental health and illness in contemporary medical 
sociology - as well as in society writ large? What is made in/visible through the use of personal 
experience in academic writing? 
In order to make a start addressing these questions, we invited contributions from a range of 
disciplines (history, psychology, sociology, service user research), resulting in a deliberately 
heterogeneous collection of papers which adopt a range of perspectives and (writing) practices. 
What they have in common is their focus on mental ill-health research, in particular, and a keen 
interest in the personal and political more generally. They differ however in their take on the 
debate on personal experiences, and the questions that guide their specific contribution to the 
special issue. They range from reflections on the consequences of using personal experiences 
in the act of doing so, through to a critical discussion on how we got to a place where we can 
think about using personal experiences (and what experience comes to mean in such a context).  
While we do not necessarily contend that there is, a priori, anything special about mental ill-
health in terms of using personal experiences, arguably mental ill-health research has a 
relatively longstanding tradition in which the personal, advocacy, and research are combined. 
Drawing on feminist scholarship among others, mental health service-user/survivor led 
research and the standpoint epistemologies central to such endeavours have gained prominence 
over the last decades, in part stemming from criticisms regarding unequal relationships between 
psychiatrists and patients (Beresford, 2005; Rose, 2017). Such research takes seriously the 
notion that personal experiences have key consequences for knowledge production and 
conceptualisations of expertise. This research also has consequences for the selfhood invested 
in and produced through these studies; researchers actively construct themselves as people with 
personal experiences of mental ill-health and thereby emphasize this aspect of themselves. 
Identity politics, then, is a strong feature of this type of research, with researchers positioning 
their own experiences, diagnoses, and emotions in certain ways in order to establish certain 
effects (e.g. promoting a social cause) (cf. Rose, Fleischmann, & Wykes, 2004). 
 
Aptly, then, the first paper in this special issue is by Diana Rose, one of the first survivor 
researchers in the UK, who reflects on the ways in which survivor research has changed over 
the years. Her paper explores the origins both of her activism and the user movement, and the 
interrelations between the two, though she also suggests that it is impossible to get to the real 
origins: this is “but a credible version”. Written partly while being in a mental health crisis 
house, this piece reflects on the credibility and functions of memory, both in the construction 
of identity and, again relatedly, how to do (user) research. Main questions evolve around the 
relationship between academia and spaces/knowledge outside academia, how to best access 
and articulate users’ voices, and the politics of personal experience in general. Rose’s account 
is frank, and she reflects candidly on how well “we respond (…) to the kind of madness that is 
hard to empathise with even whilst I think that having been both high and suicidal I can 
understand better than most professionals what a person is experiencing”. Her profoundly 
personal reflection is simultaneously a suggestion for future research and politics, in which the 
voice of service users/madness should remain central.  
A more recent development and intervention is the field of Mad Studies, that draws 
significantly on Queer Studies in its positions and theories. The second article in the special 
issue, by Brigit McWade, reflects on this field, and more broadly on how we come to be 
positioned as (not) having personal experience, and thus what personal experience means in 
the context of mental ill-health research. Such positioning, she argues, relies on strict 
dichotomies: one is either mad or not, either a researcher or a service user. In this paper, then, 
McWade critically questions these dichotomies, by examining reactions to her doctoral 
research in which she participated in a mental health service ‘as if’ she was a service user. She 
revisits three moments during and after her PhD where she felt her identity was questioned, 
and her (embodied) reactions to such questions: during a meeting with the ethics committee; 
during her viva; and during the organising of a Mad studies conference. In each of these 
settings, her position (and concordant ethics of her position) were questioned, asking McWade 
to position herself, whereas, she argues, her “research has always been about how to speak 
madness against or outside of psy discourse”. Drawing on literature on auto-ethnography, 
anthropology, and mad studies, McWade explores the power relations in identity politics, while 
also reflecting on her own “white and middle-class” position. She concludes in the spirit in 
which she started, discussing the “paradoxical rich-ness of (…) knowledge-making: let us all 
avoid the compulsion to resolve it”.  
The emphasis on personal experience, then, can divide, categorising people as either mad or 
not, either a researcher or a survivor. In the third contribution to the special issue, Isabel Frey 
uses her own experience of bulimia to reflect on, and contribute to, a shared subjectivity. She 
writes about using her own experiences with bulimia in a qualitative interview study with 
people who have (had) bulimia, ultimately leading to “a partial account of what it means to try 
to know bulimia as a former bulimic”. While the use of personal experiences in interviews has 
been both recommended as well as cautioned against (in part on ethical grounds) (Duncombe 
and Jessop, 2002; McKinzie, 2017), Frey does not engage in this debate herself, although she 
argues that it was a “necessity” for her to include her own experiences. Rather, she examines 
the knowledge practices resulting from a juxtaposition and sharing of different experiences 
with and subjectivities of bulimia, which she describes as being embodied and affective. In her 
conclusion, she reflects on what is gained through this sharing of subjectivities, which is, as 
she argues, “an extended illness narrative that is embodied, situated and shared”. This paper 
then contributes to reflections on what it means to (openly or covertly) use personal experiences 
when doing research, what is gained and, perhaps, what is lost through doing so (although the 
paper is less vocal on the potential losses), and to what understandings of mental illness 
subjectivities this may lead.  
 
In the next set of articles, authors reflect on some of the ideals that are often implicated when 
scholars draw on their own experiences, or argue why these should, or shouldn’t, be used in 
academic texts. Sarah Chaney’s paper is a reflection on the notion of ‘objectivity’ in historical 
research. She starts with an illuminating account of the discipline of history and the place of 
objectivity herein, and shows how the style of writing is often as important as the research topic 
or methodology for establishing objectivity. However, she critically questions the desirability 
and the possibility of objectivity in history, arguing that it its not only impossible to be fully 
objective, but also that it leads to better historical research (and thus a clearer view on the 
present) when historians are aware of and acknowledge their own assumptions and potential 
biases. This leads her to question the identity of the historian, and to what extent the person is 
related to, and should be explicitly related to, the research. As a historian researching self-harm, 
she has often received questions about how she came to study this topic, and what her personal 
relation was to self-harm. Yet the opposite happened too, that people questioned the legitimacy 
of her research because of the apparent lack of personal relationship to the topic. Chaney takes 
up the question of identity politics, and what it means to claim one is, for instance, a self-
harmer, or that one has experience of self-harming, and what the consequences might be of 
such claims (thus taking issue with the same dichotomous way of thinking that McWade has 
addressed as well). She concludes this section with the statement: “As long as we critique them, 
then, identity categories may be useful just as exploring out own experiences as researchers 
may be valuable.” Throughout, however, she remains agnostic as to the benefits of necessarily 
claiming an identity as a researcher - and instead argues for reflexivity on the part of all 
historians.   
Simon Clarke and Colin Wright’s paper is a theoretical contribution to the debate on the 
usefulness of using first-person accounts in or as research. They argue that much 
autoethnographic writing, if not all, start from the notion of authenticity, and claiming a true 
or real account of ‘madness’. However, they argue that there are many problems attached to 
the notion of authenticity in general and in relation to madness particularly, among which the 
heterogeneous nature of madness. While Spivak’s suggestion that essentialised notions such as 
‘women’ can be used strategically, she herself, and the authors of the paper, come to the 
conclusion that such strategic use of notions still contributes to “the very essentialist tendencies 
she was seeking to avoid in the first place”. Instead, Clarke and Wright argue, with De Certeau, 
for tactical, rather than strategic, interventions, where, for instance, service users can contribute 
to the space that psychiatry usually holds, much like “occupations are an important tactic 
among activists”. In this way, the authors argue for ‘tactical authenticity’, which, they argue, 
“makes it possible to give voice to the radical heterogeneity and singularity of the experience 
of madness”, and as such intervenes in psychiatric hegemonic discourses. Tactics, then, can be 
seen as a subversive move, “by displacing the identity-categories that we believe are part of 
the problem.” 
 
The final two papers in this volume take a further step back, situating the developments around 
personal experience in broader practices of knowledge production, without necessarily 
discussing the impact of their personal experience on the resulting practices of knowledge 
production. Chris Millard’s paper provides a genealogy of how we have come to a place where 
we can use personal experience in our research. He helpfully suggests that ‘experience’ is 
mobilised in specific ways, and not everything that could be is actually seen as experience: 
“only certain kinds of things are habitually mobilized under that particular banner”. Tracing 
back from academic work that draws on personal experience, Millard outlines three 
developments that have contributed to the conditions of possibility for such use of, and for 
what comes to be seen as, personal experience: psychoanalysis, social history, and 
anthropology. He shows how and in what ways experience became an important concept in 
each of these disciplines. After this helpful genealogy, he reflects on the consequences of the 
use of personal experience in research. While he argues that it is coureagous and “an act of 
inclusion” to “mak(e) personal experience part of academic accounts, he also argues, with 
Butler, Scott and Shortall, that doing so “leaves something out” - suggesting that we can never 
talk about experience, and give an account of ourself, outside of conventional ways of thinking. 
As such, it can contribute to essentialising differences, “as much as it seemingly liberates”.  
David Pilgrim, finally, takes up the question of reductionism, a style of thinking that he argues 
can be present both in accounts that privilege personal experience as well as in neuroscientific 
thinking, where personal experience is more usually absent. Arguing that human agency 
fundamentally stems from open-ended systems, he suggests that any account that wants to 
generalize and give a causative explanation of all behaviour is reductionistic. Drawing on 
critical realism as a philosophical tool, he tries to reconcile the two ends of the spectrum 
(neuroscience and personal experience). While the biopsychosocial model in this respect can 
be a helpful intervention, he also claims that it is often still used in a reductionistic, biology-
centric way, and, as such, “lack(ing) social and political ‘outsight’”. Instead, he argues with 
some neuroscientists that “the brain affords our capacity to be human agents but our conduct 
cannot be reduced to one or more brain mechanisms”. Moreover, he warns us that “our personal 
accounts are neither a full window into the society we are embedded in, nor into the bodily 
reality that shapes and constrains our humanity, experience, morbidity and mortality. However, 
they are important reflexive testimonies about that complexity. They are part of the picture that 
should neither be sacralised nor scorned.”  
 
Taken together, the contributions to this special issue provide a critical, in-depth and varied 
exploration of the many questions raised and – potentially – answered by engaging with 
personal experiences in mental health research. What the authors have in common is an 
awareness that there is no one true account, and they all write within, or despite, this 
assumption. However, while for some the consequences of drawing on personal experiences as 
social scientists can best be explored through actually drawing on them, others take a step back 
and reflect on the history of objectivity in research or offer a genealogy of how we got to a 
place where this can be a question. Articles range from personal reflections through to 
theoretical explorations, with some giving concrete suggestions (such as seeing 
(autoethnographic) writing as a ‘tactical intervention’) and other articles merely suggesting 
there is a need for critical (and multiple, open-ended) reflection. Ultimately, we see this 
collection of papers as a starting point in what we hope will be an ongoing, critical, reflection 
on the role of personal experiences in mental health research. 
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